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The World Bank and USAID have encouraged the coordination of Third World donor organizations as a worthwhile
and feasible endeavor. However, the authors' experience in Sudan illustrates that, despite the availability of microcom-
puters and the tacit agreement of the donor organizations themselves, donor coordination is not easily obtained.
In the summer of 1987, the government of Sudan ex-
pelled several private voluntary aid organizations from
the country and prohibited them from future operations
in Sudan. The international press reported this event as
another inexplicable example of erratic behavior by an
African government. In fact, these and other aid organiza-
tions had been operating in Sudan as if there were no
sovereign government in the country. Representatives of
these donors were flying in and out of Khartoum, the
country's capital, without the slightest pretense of co-
ordinating their activities with the Sudanese government
or other aid organizations. The recent action of the gov-
ernment of Sudan was an understandable attempt to
obtain at ieast some minimal knowledge of and control
over donor activities.
Ironically, the World Bank recently cited Sudan as a
country which has made significant progress in improving
donor coordination (IBRD, 1984, p. 42). Our own work
in Sudan suggests, however, that the problem of donor
coordination is indeed serious and is likely to prove much
more intractable than is commonly realized. In the sum-
mer of 1984, we initiated a project in Sudan funded by
the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) to work with the Sudanese Ministry of Finance
and Economic Planning (MOFEP). The purpose of the
project was to establish microcomputer-based decision
support and management information systems. One of
several components of our effort was to create a com-
puterized data base of all ongoing, planned and completed
development projects in Sudan which would assist the
MOFEP, and the donors with the planning and manage-
ment of development assistance.
The Ministry and USAID conceived of this project as
a preliminary step to promote donor coordination; it was
to provide a fast, easy way for a donor to find out what
other donors had done or were doing in a particular sec-
tor or region. This article describes the failure of the
donors to provide the information required for this proj-
ect data base to function effectively. We offer several
explanations of the donors' failure to cooperate with the
MOFEP and discuss the implications of this experience
for future attempts at donor coordination.
Background
There has for some time been a growing awareness
among both bilateral and multilateral donors that lack
of donor coordination is a major problem. It is at least
partly responsible for the failure of African economies to
effectively utilize their development assistance. In its
report Toward Sustained Development in Sub-Saharan
Africa, the World Bank paints a comprehensive, sobering
picture of the region's economic problems, and outlines
a series of policy measures necessary for its economic
rehabilitation. Two of the report's central recommenda-
tions pertain to the need for improved national economic
management and donor aid coordination. The report calls
for more strategic and flexible public sector planning by
national governments. In addition, it calls for explicit
commitments from both donors and recipient govern-
ments to implement their responsibilities under an agreed
economic recovery program. Specifically, the World Bank
calls for (1) strengthening management information sys-
tems in planning and finance ministries in order to facil-
itate timely policy analysis and strategic planning, and
(2) providing high-quality technical assistance to those
governments interested in building up such capacity
(IBRD, 1984, p. 39).
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The World Bank report pays particular attention to the
need for improved donor coordination.
Aid administration is a particularly important area for
institutional reform. Basic information on aid flows
is often lacking; responsibility for donor contact and
negotiation is unclear; links seldom exist between the
plan, the budget, sector ministries, project entities,
and donor activities. . . .The weaknesses of uncoordi-
nated aid are increasingly recognized by African gov-
ernments and donors. More consultative groups,
UNDP-sponsored roundtables, and other arrangements
have been set up to coordinate aid. . . . However, con-
sultative groups have generally suffered from two
major weaknesses. First, the commitments made by
both governments and donors on program content and
financial support have not been firm enough. Second,
the groups have failed to get more involved in detail —
priorities and assistance for particular sectors, pro-
grams, and projects, or specific changes in pricing and
other incentive policies (IBRD, 1984, pp. 39-43).
Such increased involvement by donors in the details of
aid administration is dependent upon improved access to
information on both government and donor development
activities. Our project was an attempt to work toward
improvements in these areas in Sudan.
The World Bank's call for improved donor coordina-
tion and public sector planning certainly preceded the
publication of this report, and Sudan was one of the first
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa to initiate serious efforts
along these lines. At the sixth Consultative Group Meeting
for Sudan held in Paris in January 1983, several donors,
including the United States and the European Economic
Community (EEC), called for the formation of subgroups
of donors and government representatives, organized by
sector, which would meet in Khartoum and monitor the
implementation of Sudan's economic recovery program.
The idea for these sector subgroups developed from the
World Bank's country implementation review process, in
which Bank and government representatives meet to
review progress on Bank investment programs. At the
January 1983 Consulative Group meeting, the chief World
Bank representative and chariman of the Consultative
Group reaffirmed the Bank's support for such monitor-
ing activities and welcomed the inclusion of other donors
in such discussions.
The discussions held during this Consultative Group
meeting led to the establishment of the Joint Monitoring
Committee (JMC) in 1983. The JMC was chaired by the
Minister of Finance and Economic Planning and included
the resident representatives of the World Bank, Interna-
tional Monetary Fund and concerned donors. Its primary
purpose was to provide a local forum for more detailed
discussions of how donor assistance could be better co-
ordinated with Sudan's economic policies and investment
program. It was originally envisioned that the JMC would
meet quarterly in Khartoum, and the JMC Secretariat,
consisting of staff from the planning wing of the MOFEP,
would prepare progress reports and analyses for the
quarterly meetings and for the annual Consultative Group
meeting.
The JMC met three times in 1983 and by the seventh
Consultative Group Meeting in December 1983, it was
clear to the donors that additional technical staff needed
to be assigned to the JMC Secretariat if the work of the
JMC was to be productive. Getting donors and govern-
ment representatives together was beneficial, but they
needed information and analysis on the problems they
were to discuss. Still, members of the seventh Consultative
Group Meeting were enthusiastic about the potential con-
tribution of the JMC. The chairman's report notes that
there was a consensus that the JMC was performing a
useful function and that donors should support it in the
coming year. The representative of the Netherlands said
that the JMC was a good start toward donor coordina-
tion in Sudan and that it might have applicability in other
African countries. The EEC representative supported the
work of the JMC and hoped that the coordination that
had been started would be intensified and extended.
Finally, the Sudanese Minister of Finance and Economic
Planning at the time promised a strengthening of the JMC
and noted that the local donor representatives would need
timely information on commitments and disbursements
from their central offices in order to support its work.
The seventh Consultative Group also assigned the JMC
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several matters to examine, the most important of which
was aid disbursement. The Minister of MOFEP suggested
that a comprehensive review of donor disbursement pro-
cedures needed to be conducted in order to understand
the reasons for the slowdown in disbursement of com-
modity aid. The representatives of the Arab Fund and the
African Development Bank expressed the view that the
issue of undisbursed project assistance should be ex-
amined to see if ways could be found to increase the flow
of previously committed money, and also recommended
that this task be given to the Joint Monitoring Committee.
Thus, in December 1983, there was ostensibly strong
support for improved donor coordination in Sudan and
for the work of the JMC, when quite independently we
proposed to the USAID Khartoum mission director that
a microcomputer data base of development projects in
Sudan be established. Our initial idea was to create a data
base using commercially available software (dBase III);
each record in the data base would contain various kinds
of information on a specific development project. Users
could easily search the project data bases for projects of
a certain type (e.g., all agricultural and irrigation projects
in a particular region, or all energy projects funded by
Western European donors which are behind schedule).
As originally envisioned, this computerized project
directory was to serve two primary objectives. First, a cen-
tralized, easily accessible project data base would provide
an overview of donor-financed development activities,
and promote the dissemination of information on proj-
ects among donors. The MOFEP staff could prepare
reports in response to specific requests from donors or
government agencies for project information. Although
conceptually simple, the importance of this objective of
information storage and dissemination should not be
underestimated. The institutional memory of donor or-
ganizations in countries such as Sudan is quite short due
to brief staff assignments, so there is an urgent need for
basic data on project activities. Paper records are poorly
maintained, and project reports are not widely circulated.
The second objective, and ultimately the more impor-
tant one, was to begin to establish a project data base
which would support an improved planning and budget-
ing system within the MOFEP. An up-to-date, centralized
project data base is essential for (1) the preparation of
the development budget, (2) sectoral planning, (3) the
estimation of recurrent costs, and (4) project monitoring
and evaluation. One major goal was to provide the Min-
istry with an early warning system for implementation
and financial problems on development projects.
The need for a centralized set of data on development
projects was widely recognized within the MOFEP and
the donor community. The April, 1984 World Bank
report, Sudan: Planning and Budgeting for Recovery, by
R. Ridker, called for the establishment of a centralized
project directory, and actually proposed two project data
forms for use in system design and data collection. The
MOFEP itself had made several attempts to collect proj-
ect data, and various forms were available in the Minis-
try. For example, when we began our project in the
summer of 1984, we were shown a collection of hand-
written index cards which contained limited project infor-
mation. In addition, the UNDP Advisors to the MOFEP
had drafted forms to be used to collect information on
project activities.
This discussion demonstrates that, although the com-
puterization of a project directory may have been some-
what original in Khartoum, the need for a central file of
information on development projects was widely recog-
nized, both by the MOFEP and the donor community.
In our opinion, however, the actual physical processing
and management of the records for approximately 250 on-
going, donor-financed development projects and 750 loans
and grants proved a major impediment to both simple
data analysis and improved planning and budgeting pro-
cedures. A computer data base was the most practical way
to efficiently manage this much information in a timely
manner. In the summer of 1984, we arrived in Khartoum
to attempt to create such a data base.
Data Collection Efforts
The development of the software for the project direc-
tory was quite straightforward. By far the most difficult
part of establishing the project directory was the collec-
tion of the data to put into the system. There were three
primary places where project data could be located: donor
offices, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
Omdurman Market, Sudan.
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itself and the implementing agencies. This section describes
the efforts to collect data from the donor community.
At the July 1984 meeting of the Joint Monitoring Com-
mittee, the Undersecretary of Planning formally an-
nounced that USAID had agreed to fund our project to
establish a microcomputer-based development project
data base. He requested the donors' assistance in this
work, reminding them of discussions along these lines at
the December 1983 Consultative Group Meeting. In Au-
gust 1984, together with staff from the Secretariat of the
JMC, we personally visited the representatives of the
major bilateral and international donors in Khartoum to
explain the nature of the proposed project directory and
to elicit their help in completing two data forms which
had been designed to collect information on donor-
financed development projects. We paid personal visits
to the Khartoum representatives of the following donors:
UNDP, World Bank, EEC, France, United Kingdom, Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands,
Switzerland and USAID. These visits were followed up
by a formal written request to twenty-two donors from
the Undersecretary of Planning in August 1984, in which
he requested their assistance in completing these two
forms. In addition to the eleven donors noted above, this
letter was sent to the Embassy of Denmark, African
Development Bank, OPEC Fund for International Devel-
opment, Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development,
Islamic Development Bank, Abu Dhabi Fund for Eco-
nomic and Social Development, Abu Dhabi Government,
Saudi Fund for Development, Arab Fund for Economic
and Social Development, UNCDF and International Fund
for Agricultural Development.
To the best of our knowledge, the Undersecretary never
received a reply to his letter from the World Bank, UNDP,
EEC, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Netherlands,
Switzerland, Kuwait Fund for Economic Development, or
the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development.
Contrary to the expectations of the Western donors, by
far the most complete, thorough and prompt responses
were received from the Arab donors. Most of the major
Western donors never even bothered to answer the Under-
secretary's letter; even among the respondents, several
replied in a superficial and incomplete manner.
In November 1984 and in January 1985, we again
visited the Khartoum offices of many of these donors to
request their cooperation in this effort. The Undersecre-
tary of Planning also sent a follow-up letter in January
1985, noting the importance of this work for the JMC.
By the summer of 1985, the Undersecretary had received
only two replies to his second request for project profiles
from the donors: a letter from the Federal Republic of Ger-
many informing the undersecretary that they did not have
time to fill out the forms, and two project data forms from
the Swiss Embassy.
What we find extraordinary about this experience is
that the majority of the donors did not even feel obliged
to answer the Undersecretary's letters, a seemingly simple
courtesy. Perhaps the experience with the World Bank best
illustrates the lack of donor cooperation in this effort. As
noted, this effort was directly responsive to World Bank
policy objectives in Sub-Saharan Africa. The World
Bank's own mission to Sudan in March 1984 called for
the establishment of a computerized data base in Sudan.
World Bank staff in both Khartoum and Washington were
contacted personally on several occasions to make specific
suggestions for changes in the project directory. These
were incorporated into the system design. World Bank
staff continually promised to cooperate with the MOFEP
and USAID to support this effort. Yet the World Bank
did not complete the data forms nor did it answer the
letters from the Undersecretary.
Reasons for the Donors' Failure to Cooperate
In their recent book, Does Aid Work? (1986), Robert
Cassen and his associates note three main reasons for
donors' reluctance to undertake meaningful aid coordina-
tion efforts:
a. Coordination is likely to impair the freedom with
which donors can pursue their political and commer-
cial interests through their aid programs.
b. Donors know that there are both ideological and tech-
nical subjects on which they are likely to disagree, and
aid coordination would create conflicts.
c. Aid coordination can be costly in administrative time
and money.
Although these explanations certainly have merit, based
on our experience in Sudan the problem of donor coor-
dination seems likely to be more invidious than these
reasons suggest. We found both related and additional
explanations for the failure of the donors to cooperate
with the MOFEP and USAID to establish a central deposi-
tory of information on projects. We have categorized them
into three groups: (1) reasons internal to the donor bureau-
cracy, (2) donors' impressions of the external planning
environment, and (3) donors' impressions of the micro-
computer technology itself. Each of these explanations
was informally proffered to us by donor representatives
themselves in follow-up interviews we conducted in the
summer of 1985.
First, even if donors' intentions are good, there is a
variety of organizational pressures which mitigate against
real cooperation. Donor bureaucracies are not structured
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to promote aid coordination. There are few bureaucratic
incentives to individuals within donor bureaucracies to
work with other donors. As the World Bank has noted,
donor coordination is administratively demanding and
time consuming and it is rarely rewarded in terms of pro-
fessional evaluation or promotion (1984, p. 43). Both ex-
ecutives and junior staff are evaluated by central offices
which have little awareness of efforts by their field staff
to work with other donors. In fact, central office personnel
evaluation procedures often foster competition between
donors. An enterprising program officer who lets others
know some of his "best" project ideas may well find them
funded by other donors. On the other hand, many donors
make most of their major programming decisions at the
central headquarters so that individuals in the field typi-
cally feel there is little they can do to promote donor coor-
dination, even if they wanted to. Finally, the donors' field
offices are typically understaffed relative to central head-
quarters, and the individuals from whom we requested
assistance were often extremely busy.
The second set of explanations concerns the donors'
perceptions of their external planning environment. Given
the pressures on their time, donor representatives were
forced to make a judgment as to the likelihood of success
of our effort to establish a computerized project data base,
and the effectiveness of such a system if it were estab-
lished. Too often, the subjective probability assigned to
both of these events was low. The likelihood that we
would succeed in creating the system in the first place was
perceived to be low, in part because each donor felt the
other donors would not cooperate. Therefore, individual
donors saw little reason to participate in the data col-
lection effort themselves. The Western bilateral donors,
in particular, felt that the Arab donors would not coop-
erate. This is a classic "free rider" problem which we had
hoped to address by reaching a collective agreement in
the JMC to support this effort. In the end, however, the
JMC failed to meet regularly. Moreover, little informal
pressure could ,be exerted on donors who did not par-
ticipate.
The donors also had little regard for the efficacy of the
planning wing of the Ministry. To many donor represen-
tatives, the planning wing was so ineffective as to be
irrelevant to their objectives. Their primary interest in the
Planning Ministry had become finding the easiest, fastest
means of getting their projects approved and their funds
disbursed. An effective planning operation in the MOFEP
would inevitably entail less discretion on the part of the
donors in programming their aid and, in the short run
at least, this was perceived to be an obstacle to their aid
program rather than a necessary step in institutional
development. It was thus not clear to donors that the
The capital city of Sudan, Khartoum.
MOFEP wanted the effort to succeed. As one representa-
tive of a private voluntary organization put it,
I don't really think you will be able to establish this
microcomputer data base, but what happens if you do?
I see more problems for me than advantages. Why
should I want to give the Planning Ministry the in-
formation to meddle in our affairs?
Another related reason for the donors' failure to coop-
erate which pertained to their impression of the external
planning environment was that the project was perceived
to be too closely tied to USAID. For the planning wing
of the MOFEP to have a centralized data base of develop-
ment projects was bad enough; for USAID to be the only
donor with such centralized information was even worse.
At the July 1984 JMC meeting, this project was announced
to the donors. Both USAID and MOFEP representatives
assured the other donors that the data in the project
directory would be available to all. However, the donors'
skepticism is understandable in an environment where
data is scarce and is typically treated as proprietary. There
was a fear that the planning wing of MOFEP, and in-
directly USAID, would have much greater access to the
project data base. For at least one donor representative,
there was also an underlying apprehension about creating
the institutional capability in what was then a military
dictatorship to create and manage centralized data bases.
(This concern was not entirely unwarranted. Within a
matter of just a few weeks after the creation of the new
Management Information System Unit in the MOFEP, one
of the USAID-supplied computers was commandeered by
the security police whose stated objective was to set up
a data base of automobile license plates in Khartoum).
A third set of reasons for the donors' lack of coopera-
tion relates to their impressions of the technology itself.
Individuals working for donor agencies in a place like
Sudan can hardly be expected to be up-to-date in the latest
developments in microcomputer technology, and, indeed,
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they were not. For this reason, they were unable to real-
istically evaluate the magnitude of the software develop-
ment which we proposed and the likelihood that it would
succeed. Many had had frustrating experiences with main-
frame computers of some sort and tended to extrapolate
their horror stories to microcomputers. We encountered
a wide range of skeptical comments about computers in
general. At least five individuals independently offered
us that sage advice, "garbage in; garbage out," implying
that the whole effort was futile. The message was really
that computers were an inappropriate technology in such
a data-poor environment; that this was simply another
example of a capital-intensive technology being pushed
by donors without regard to the needs and capabilities
of the local economy. We disagree with this line of reason-
ing, but it certainly deserves serious examination (see
Calhoun, Drummond and Whittington, 1987).
In contrast to hardware issues, several donor represen-
tatives felt that the software development applications we
proposed were far too sophisticated. In reality, the soft-
ware development was the easiest, most tractable and least
time consuming part of our assignment. Maintaining soft-
ware and training people in its use, on the other hand,
is an important issue.
Implications for Future Donor Coordination Efforts
To date, the campaign for donor coordination has been
carried out at a fairly superficial level. It is one more
exercise in what Robertson (1985) has termed the "ritual
of planned development." Many of the donors that rheto-
rically call for coordination simply do not want it. More-
over, many Western donors adopt a patronizing attitude
towards the whole process. Their attitude is also a source
of misunderstanding about their own and others' perfor-
mance. At the center of this patronizing attitude is a belief
in their own bureaucratic efficiency and in the inefficiency
of the host country's bureaucracy.
Although donors such as the World Bank support the
idea of improved donor coordination, their representa-
tives do not really know what this entails in terms of data
management and analysis. Most donor coordination
efforts have not proceeded beyond the level of general
discussions because donors place data management de-
mands upon the ministries of finance and planning which
even the donors themselves do not know how to address.
Few donor representatives have thought seriously about
how they would manage the flow of paperwork associated
with hundreds of millions of dollars of aid from thirty
donor agencies — all with different accounting procedures,
currencies and priorities — with the limited budget avail-
able to a minister of finance or planning in an aid-
dependent economy such as Sudan's.
Ironically, donors' demands for information on the
recipient government's development projects and policies
may be greatest precisely in those cases where the govern-
ment is least able to respond and where the development
plans are least likely to be effective. Such demands can
contribute to the destruction of host country planning
institutions (Morss, 1984). This suggests to us that the field
staff of donor agencies concerned with aid administra-
tion need to spend less time giving advice to ministries
of finance and planning about data management and
planning problems which they themselves have never
faced, and more time actually working with these bureau-
cracies to improve their management information and
decision support systems. In our experience, many of the
staff of the MOFEP want to do a better job managing and
coordinating donor assistance, but it is a complicated task
with which they need help — particularly in the area of
microcomputer applications. Donors tend to berate them,
but offer little in the way of ideas or concrete assistance.
Moreover, donors do not adequately appreciate the nature
of the data management demands they themselves are
placing on the development planning enterprise.
Calls for improved donor coordination are likely to fail
unless underlying organizational and attitudinal issues are
addressed more directly and seriously. Part of the prob-
lem is simply that all donors want to coordinate, but no
one wants to be coordinated. Based on our experiences
in Sudan, we believe future improvements in the area of
donor coordination depend in large part upon more
explicit policy directives from top management in both
multilateral and bilateral donor agencies. Almost without
exception, the donor representatives in Khartoum with
whom we dealt treated donor coordination as a peripheral
concern. Typically, their primary responsibility was to see
that the budget targets for their aid allocations were spent,
not that they were effectively coordinated with national
government priorities and the work of other donors.
Top managers in donor agencies must change the in-
centive structure which their staff faces, in order that time
spent on coordination with other donors is recognized and
rewarded in personnel evaluations and advancement.
Until then, real progress in donor coordination will be
slow. We suggest that management experiment with ways
of obtaining written evaluations of staff job performance
from national government counterparts in the ministries
with which they deal. Management must also realize that
donor coordination efforts are time consuming and re-
quire a long-term commitment to the institutional de-
velopment of both the donor agency and the national
government. If serious attention is given to the issue of
donor coordination, information management support of
the kind we tried to develop will be essential.
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